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SUPPRESSION OF FREE TWEETS: HOW PACKINGHAM
IMPACTS THE NEW ERA OF GOVERNMENT SOCIAL
MEDIA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Elise Berry* 
With the growing number of social media channels available for 
members of the public to voice their opinion, it is no surprise there have 
been questions as to social networking’s compatibility with the First 
Amendment. The most recent issue that has come to light is whether 
public officials who ban or block users from their official social media 
pages risk facing a First Amendment violation.1 One example is President 
Donald Trump’s use of his Twitter account to block certain Twitter users 
from accessing his page or responding to his “tweets.” President Trump 
has allegedly blocked at least eighty users from his Twitter,2 and many of 
those blocked allege it was done in retaliation against their critical 
responses.3 Some of these users have initiated a lawsuit against President 
Trump, former White House Press Secretary, Sean Spicer, and White 
House Director of Social Media and Assistant to the President, Daniel 
Scavino.4 Asserting that the President’s Twitter is a public forum, 
plaintiffs argue that by blocking them for their critical remarks, the 
President engaged in viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First 
Amendment.5 
* J.D. Candidate 2019, Florida State University College of Law. I would like to thank Professor Nat
Stern for advising me on this Note and teaching me the fundamentals of constitutional law.  
1. See, e.g., Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 706 (E.D. Va. 
2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-2003 (4th Cir. Aug. 29, 2017). 
2. Kevin Poulsen, Tracker for Twitter Users Blocked by @realDonaldTrump, 
TRUMPBLOCKS.ME, https://trumpblocks.me/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2017).  
3. See Diana Pearl, A Cancer Patient, Rosie O’Donnell and More Critics President Trump
Has Blocked on Twitter, PEOPLE POLITICS (Sep. 20, 2017, 6:18 PM), http://people.com/
politics/people-president-trump-blocked-twitter-chrissy-teigen-stephen-king/. 
4. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Knight First Amend. Inst. at Columbia
Univ., v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-05205 (S.D. N.Y. July 11, 2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/
documents/3892179/2017-07-11-Knight-Institute-Trump-Twitter.pdf. 
5. Id. at 2-3. 
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Social media’s intersection with the First Amendment has become 
an increasingly popular topic among lower courts in recent years,6 and the 
Supreme Court’s silence on the issue had led legal researchers to theorize 
the scope of First Amendment protection as applied to online speech.7 
However, in its recent decision in Packingham v. North Carolina,8 the 
Court ruled that access to the Internet and social media is a 
constitutionally protected right.9 Packingham illustrates a vast shift in the 
Court’s First Amendment analysis by embracing social media and the 
Internet as “the most important places (in a spatial sense)” to exercise First 
Amendment rights.10 In particular, the Court recognized that social 
networking sites like Facebook and Twitter play a significant role in 
providing users the opportunity to engage in political activism and public 
debate.11 
One month after the Packingham decision, a Virginia district court 
in Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors12 held that a county 
official’s act of blocking a user from her county official Facebook page 
for criticism was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.13 The court 
cited Packingham for the proposition that social media opens a digital 
forum for the exchange of ideas, demonstrating the impact Packingham 
will continue to have on the lower courts.14 
This Note will analyze the public forum doctrine and examine 
Packingham’s impact on its application in the new era of social media, 
particularly one maintained by a public official. Part I is a summary of the 
6. See, e.g., Grutzmacher v. Howard Cty., 851 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2017) (public employee’s
racially insensitive Facebook status and “like” of a disrespectful picture was not protected speech 
under the First Amendment); Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding 
police department’s social networking policy restricted officers’ right to speak on matters of public 
concern); Palmer v. Cty. of Anoka, 200 F. Supp. 3d 842, 844 (D. Minn. 2016) (finding public 
employee’s termination for statements made on Facebook was not in violation of the First 
Amendment). 
7. See, e.g., Benjamin Jackson, Censorship and Freedom of Expression in the Age of
Facebook, 44 N.M.L. REV. 121 (2014) (arguing that First Amendment protections should extend to 
social media communications); Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U.L. REV. 1975 (2011) 
(analyzing First Amendment implications by applying the public forum doctrine to social media). 
8. 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017). 
9. The Court invalidated a state statute that prohibited convicted sex offenders from accessing 
social media on the ground that its prohibition was overly-broad. Id. at 1737-38. 
10. Id. at 1735. 
11. See id. (noting that Twitter allows users to petition their elected representatives and engage 
in political debates). 
12. 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 706 (E.D. Va. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-2003 (4th Cir. Aug.
29, 2017). 
13. Id. at 717 (“By prohibiting Plaintiff from participating in her online forum because she
took offense at his claim . . . Defendant committed a cardinal sin under the First Amendment.”). 
14. See id. at 716. 
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public forum doctrine and its evolution through the years. Part II will 
explain when the government may speak with less constitutional 
restrictions and whether it would apply to a public official’s social media. 
Part III will discuss the Supreme Court’s protection of political speech 
against government censorship. Part IV will provide a summary of 
Packingham v. North Carolina and its potential impact on the public 
forum doctrine’s application to a public official’s social media. Finally, 
Part V will analyze whether the President, the highest-ranked public 
official, violates the First Amendment by excluding users from his public 
social media account. This Note concludes by offering a new approach for 
finding a public forum in a government official’s social media. 
I. PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE 
If the government opens a forum for public discussion, the First 
Amendment applies a stricter standard of scrutiny for excluding speech 
than when it opens a nonpublic forum. Regardless of its public or 
nonpublic status, however, the government is prohibited from restricting 
speech because of its viewpoint. In 1983, the Supreme Court in Perry 
Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n15 articulated a 
framework for the public forum doctrine, identifying three categories of 
fora that apply different protections under the First Amendment. While a 
public forum has been applied to government-owned property, the Court 
has made clear that a forum may occupy a “metaphysical” space,16 or even 
a privately-owned property leased by the government.17 Therefore, the 
doctrine may well apply to a public official’s social media, despite the 
website’s private ownership.18 
A. Traditional Public Forum 
The first category is the traditional public forum, articulated as public 
places “which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted 
15. 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
16. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) (finding
a student newspaper to be a designated public forum).  
17. See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (finding a privately-owned 
theater leased by the city to be a public forum); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. 
F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727, 792 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (public fora are not “limited to 
property owned by the government.”). 
18. Lidsky, supra note 7, at 1996 (“Just as the government can rent a building to use as a forum 
for public debate and discussion, so, too, can it ‘rent’ a social media page for the promotion of public 
discussion.”). 
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to assembly and debate.”19 The traditional public forum receives the 
greatest First Amendment protection against restricted speech, requiring 
the government to show any restriction on speech is “necessary to serve a 
compelling state interest” and “content-neutral,[and] narrowly tailored to 
serve a significant government interest.”20 In other words, any regulation 
of the content of speech is subject to strict scrutiny.21 In Perry, the Court 
considered streets and parks to be the “quintessential public forums” for 
expression,22 which was widely interpreted as limiting traditional public 
forums to streets, parks, sidewalks, or other government property.23 
However, these public spaces alone are not sufficient to achieve 
traditional public forum status. Instead, the public property must possess 
characteristics of areas that are “traditionally open to expressive 
activity.”24 
This emphasis on tradition and historical use has been an important 
factor in the Court’s traditional public forum analysis, particularly where 
the governmental property at issue is a modern concept or a relatively new 
technology. For instance, the Court has refused to extend traditional 
public forum status to an airport terminal because, “given the lateness with 
which the modern air terminal has made its appearance, it hardly qualifies 
for the description of having ‘immemorially . . . time out of mind’ been 
held in the public trust and used for purposes of expressive activity.”25 
The Court has used this same rationale to reject its application to a 
broadcasted debate,26 specialty license plates,27 and a public library’s 
Internet access.28 As the Court recognized in United States v. American 
Library Ass’n: 
19. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citing Hague 
v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). 
20. Id. (“In places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly 
and debate, the rights of the state to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.”). 
21. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 818 (1985) (Powell, 
J., concurring) (“In a traditional public forum, the government rarely could offer as a compelling 
interest the need to reserve the property for its normal uses, because expressive activity of all types 
traditionally has been a normal use of the property.”). 
22. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
23. See Michael Friedman, Dazed and Confused: Explaining Judicial Determinations of
Traditional Public Forum Status, 82 TUL. L. REV. 929, 946-47, 956 (2008). 
24. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990) (refusing to find traditional public
forum for a Postal Office sidewalk that led from the parking lot to the front door). 
25. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992) (quoting
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)). 
26. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998). 
27. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250 (2015). 
28. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
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Internet access in public libraries is neither a “traditional” nor a 
“designated” public forum. First, this resource—which did not exist 
until quite recently—has not “immemorially been held in trust for the 
use of the public and, time out of mind, . . . been used for purposes of 
assembly, communication of thoughts between citizens, and discussing 
public questions.” We have “rejected the view that traditional public 
forum status extends beyond its historic confines.” The doctrines 
surrounding traditional public forums may not be extended to situations 
where such history is lacking.29 
Nevertheless, the Court has stated that the “principal purpose of 
traditional public fora is the free exchange of ideas.”30 Given the spatial 
ability of citizens to access social media for the intended purpose of 
expressing their views on important issues, it is not inconceivable for a 
public official’s social media account to obtain the same standard of 
scrutiny that is applied to a traditional public forum.31 The Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Packingham v. North Carolina makes this a 
particularly compelling argument given the Court’s elevated stance on 
social media as “the most important place[] (in a spatial sense) for the 
exchange of views,” comparing it to streets and parks.32 
B. Designated Public Forum 
The second category of public fora applies to circumstances in which 
the government has opened non-traditional public property “for use by the 
public as a place for expressive activity.”33 In Perry, the Court explained 
that the First Amendment “forbids a state to enforce certain exclusions 
from a forum generally open to the public even if it was not required to 
create the forum in the first place.”34 However, “[a] public forum may be 
created for a limited purpose,” such as restricting the forum to “certain 
groups” or for certain topics.35 When the government opens a non-
traditional forum, “it is bound by the same standards as apply in a 
29. Id. at 205-06 (multiple citations omitted).
30. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). 
31. See Noah D. Zatz, Sidewalks in Cyberspace: Making Space for Public Forums in the
Electronic Environment, 12 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 149, 200-01 (1998) (arguing that, given the mass 
access that the Internet provides to speakers on the general public for public debate, a framework to 
the traditional public forum should apply to the Internet). 
32. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017); id. at 1737 (“These 
websites can provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make 
his or her voice heard.”). 
33. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educs.’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 45, n.7. 
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traditional public forum.”36 In other words, strict scrutiny applies when 
the government restricts speech in an area it designates for public 
discussion, but unlike the traditional public forum, the government may 
close the forum at its discretion. 
The Supreme Court has held that “the government does not create a 
[designated] public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, 
but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public 
discourse.”37 Government intent has been discerned by looking to the 
government’s policy and procedure and “the nature of the property and its 
compatibility with expressive activity.”38 In determining whether a public 
forum has been created, the Court has also distinguished between 
“selective access,” which would indicate a nonpublic forum, from 
“general access,” which indicates a designated public forum.39 That is, a 
designated public forum is created when the government makes its 
property “generally available” to a certain class of speakers, but not when 
the government requires permission to its property, which it reserves for 
a particular class of speakers.40 Accordingly, a designated public forum 
requires the government’s intent to make its property “generally 
available” to the public. 
C. Limited Public Forum 
While the Supreme Court has had trouble distinguishing between the 
limited public forum and the other non-traditional fora,41 the labels are 
merely a matter of semantics.42 Ultimately, the Court looks to whether the 
property involved is open to the public (either by tradition or designation), 
in which case strict scrutiny applies, or closed (limited to a specific 
purpose, specific topic, or specific speakers), in which case the restricted 
speech must only be reasonable and viewpoint neutral.43 
36. Id. at 46. 
37. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985). 
38. Id. 
39. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998). 
40. Id. 
41. Compare Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250-
51 (2015) (distinguishing between traditional, designated, limited, and nonpublic fora) with Am. 
Freedom Def. Initiative v. King Cty., Wash., 136 S. Ct. 1022, 1022 (2016) (Thomas, J. dissenting) 
(equating the limited public forum to a nonpublic forum). 
42. See Mark Rohr, First Amendment Fora Revisited: How Many Categories Are There?, 41 
NOVA L. REV. 221, 232-33 (2017) (noting that the limited and non-public fora lead to the same judicial 
analysis); Lidsky, supra note 7, at 1984 n.46 (noting that the designated public forum operates no 
differently than the traditional public forum, and that the only “constitutional difference” is that the 
designated public forum may be closed completely). 
43. See Rohr, supra note 42, at 233. 
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D. Nonpublic Forum 
The nonpublic forum has been characterized as government owned 
or controlled property that is neither by tradition nor designation a forum 
for public communication.44 Unlike the traditional and designated public 
fora, the government “may reserve the forum for its intended purposes,” 
so long as the restrictions are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.45 While 
the nonpublic forum has the broadest discretion, viewpoint discrimination 
is prohibited in all fora.46 Viewpoint discrimination is found where there 
is an exclusion based on a speaker’s perspective on a certain topic, and is 
presumed to be unconstitutional when “directed against speech otherwise 
within the forum’s limitations.”47 Thus, any restriction on speech that 
opposes one viewpoint over another is subject to a heightened scrutiny, 
and likely to be found unconstitutional.48 
II. SPEECH ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT
A. Government Speech Doctrine 
When it is determined that the government itself is speaking, either 
through its statements, actions, or funding, the prohibition against 
viewpoint discrimination does not apply. The rationale is that the 
government must be free to say what it wishes in order to perform its 
functions efficiently and govern properly.49 Understandably, this 
relatively new doctrine has created tension with the public forum doctrine; 
where one flatly prohibits the government’s exercise of viewpoint 
discrimination, the other broadly permits its use. 
44. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
45. Id. 
46. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (“[T]he 
government violates the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the 
point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject.”). 
47. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995). 
48. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying 
the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply 
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”). 
49. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“It is the very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view.”); Amy Riley 
Lucas, Specialty License Plates: The First Amendment and the Intersection of Government Speech 
and Public Forum Doctrines, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1971, 1976 (2008) (“Were the government required 
to [consider viewpoints], its operations would slow to a crawl, and endless time would be spent 
evaluating choices rather than making decisions.”). 
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The Supreme Court first addressed this conflict in Pleasant Grove 
City, Utah v. Summum,50 which featured a public park—a place the Court 
considers the “quintessential” public forum.51 The City denied a religious 
organization’s request to build a religious monument in the park, despite 
the City’s adoption and display of a Ten Commandments monument.52 
The majority upheld the City’s denial of the monument, explaining how 
governments have traditionally used monuments to speak to the public, 
and the selective acceptance of these monuments are meant to convey the 
government’s message.53 Acknowledging that “[t]here may be situations 
in which it is difficult to tell whether a government entity is speaking on 
its own behalf or is providing a forum for private speech,”54 the Court 
nevertheless held that forum analysis “does not apply to the installation of 
permanent monuments on public property.”55 Although the Court looked 
to the government’s historical use of monuments to speak to the public 
and its exercise of selectivity in adopting them,56 the Court’s reasoning 
for rejecting the forum analysis also relied on the unreasonable 
consequence of a contrary holding.57 
The Court’s decision in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of 
Confederate Veterans, Inc. also rejected the applicability of the forum 
analysis and found government speech in state-issued specialty license 
plates designed by private speakers.58 The Court established a three-factor 
inquiry for determining when the government is speaking: (1) the history 
of the government’s use of the property; (2) the reasonable observer’s 
interpretation of the property as the government’s own; and (3) the 
government’s direct control of the message, which may amount to mere 
“final approval authority.”59 
Walker has been criticized for setting a low bar for the government 
to take advantage of discrimination against private speech by adopting it 
50. 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
51. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
52. Summum, 555 U.S. at 465. 
53. Id. at 472. 
54. Id. at 470. 
55. Id. at 480. 
56. Id. at 470-71. 
57. Id. at 480 (“[W]here the application of forum analysis would lead almost inexorably to
closing of the forum, it is obvious that forum analysis is out of place.”). This pragmatic approach is 
said to drive the Court’s First Amendment analysis. See Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, 
Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 899, 915 (2010) (explaining how the Court makes 
decisions that produce reasonable results). 
58. 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015). 
59. Id. at 2248-49. 
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as its own.60 However, the Court’s recent decision in Matal v. Tam61 
acknowledged the doctrine’s susceptibility for “dangerous misuse” and 
refused to find government speech in federally registered trademarks.62 
Applying the Walker test, the Court determined that trademarks are 
neither traditionally used to convey a government message, nor 
commonly associated with the government; rather, the government 
registers a trademark without regard to whether it conveys a consistent 
viewpoint with its government policy.63 
When applying the Walker test to a public official’s social media, it 
is important to note that the relevant speech analyzed are not the posts 
created by the public official, but the responses by private users. 
Therefore, the government speech doctrine does not provide any 
protection for a public official’s viewpoint-based exclusion from his or 
her social media page.64 First, social media has not “traditionally been 
used to convey a [g]overnment message.”65 Second, the comments and 
responses made by other users on the public official’s page are not 
“closely identified in the public mind” as to be confused with the 
government’s own message.66 Finally, the public official does not 
maintain “direct control over the messages conveyed.”67 While the public 
official may have the power to delete comments and block users, it has no 
ability to edit the comments made by other users on his page.68 
60. See id. at 2255-56 (Alito, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for classifying private
speech as government speech and stripping it of all First Amendment protection); Leslie Gielow 
Jacobs, Government Identity Speech Programs: Understanding and Applying the New Walker Test, 
44 PEPP. L. REV. 305, 331 (stating that Walker sets no limitation to the government’s exercise of 
viewpoint discrimination when adopting private speech as its own). But see Erwin Chemerinsky, The 
First Amendment in the Era of President Trump, 94 DENV. L. REV., 553, 558-62 (2017) (suggesting 
the Court applies special deference to government speech over private speech when the institutional 
interests of the government are at stake). 
61. 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
62. Id. at 1758, 1760 (“Holding that the registration of a trademark converts the mark into
government speech would constitute a huge and dangerous extension of the government-speech 
doctrine.”). 
63. Id. at 1758-59. 
64. However, government speech has been found in government websites. See Sutliffe v.
Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314, 329 (1st Cir. 2009) (upholding town’s refusal to add hyperlink to 
town’s official website); Page v. Lexington Cty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2008) (school 
district’s website retained “sole control” of including links on its website). 
65. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1760. 
66. Id. (quoting Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2249 
(2015)). Since users on Facebook and Twitter have distinct usernames and pictures accompanying 
these responses on the public official’s page or posts, there is no reason to believe these messages 
would be mistaken for the government’s own. 
67. Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249. 
68. See Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1758 (“The Federal Government does not dream up these marks, 
and it does not edit marks submitted for registration.”). 
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B. State Action/Color of Law 
A constitutional right is only protected if the “the conduct allegedly 
causing the deprivation” is “fairly attributable to the State.”69 Private 
conduct, “however discriminatory or wrongful,” is afforded no such 
protection.70 State action may be found “if there is such a close nexus 
between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private 
behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.”71 Social media 
is no exception to the state action doctrine, since “[t]he test is not the form 
in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether 
such power has in fact been exercised.”72 
Therefore, for users banned from a public official’s social media to 
successfully allege a constitutional violation, they must first demonstrate 
that the public official maintained the social media page in his or her 
official capacity and not as a personal account. The district court in 
Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors73 looked at several 
factors74 in finding that the county official operated her Facebook page 
“while purporting to act under the authority vested in [her] by the state.”75 
The court rejected the county official’s argument that the page was 
entirely private, even if she maintained the webpage “outside of both her 
office and normal working hours.”76 
III. POLITICAL SPEECH AND THE PROTECTION AGAINST GOVERNMENT
CENSORSHIP 
The First Amendment protects the right of a private individual to 
speak freely on matters of public debate without fear of censorship, 
69. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). 
70. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). 
71. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) 
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). 
72. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964). 
73. 267 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-2003 (4th Cir. Aug. 29,
2017). 
74. These factors included: the page being named under the official title of the County Chair; 
the categorization of the page was that of a government official’s; the page included the county phone 
number and official county email and website link; the posts were directed to the county constituents, 
spoke on behalf of the county Board of Supervisors as a whole, encouraged “back and forth 
constituent conversations,” and related to matters regarding the county official’s office. Id. at 714. 
75. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Hughes v. Halifax Cty. Sch. Bd., 855 F.2d 183,
186-87 (4th Cir. 1988)).  
76. Id. at 712. 
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government suppression, or retaliation.77 This is the principle for 
affording heightened scrutiny to viewpoint discrimination.78 The Supreme 
Court has demonstrated significant concern for ruling in a way that could 
potentially chill speech, particularly when it involves public or political 
matters.79 
Political speech is said to be “at the core of what the First 
Amendment is designed to protect.”80 It is therefore entitled to the greatest 
constitutional protection against speech restriction in order to assure the 
“unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
social changes desired by the people.”81 That is, when a law negatively 
impacts political speech, the Court applies “exacting scrutiny,” requiring 
the government to show the restriction is “narrowly tailored to serve an 
overriding state interest.”82 A similar rationale was used to adopt a 
heightened standard for defamation claims by public officials in what is 
considered one of the greatest First Amendment decisions in American 
history, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.83 
A. Criticism of Public Officials: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 
In 1964, the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan presented the question of whether a public official may 
bring a libel action against critics of his official conduct.84 Recognizing 
77. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (“The protection given speech and
press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
social changes desired by the people.”). 
78. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 894 (1995) (Souter,
J., dissenting) (“[T]he prohibition on viewpoint discrimination serves that important purpose of the 
Free Speech Clause, which is to bar the government from skewing public debate.”). 
79. See Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956 (1984) (“[W]hen 
there is a danger of chilling free speech, the concern that constitutional adjudication be avoided 
whenever possible may be outweighed by society’s interest in having the statute challenged.”); see 
also Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014) (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted) 
(“Speech involves matters of public concern when it can be fairly considered as relating to any matter 
of political, social, or other concern to the community.”). 
80. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (plurality opinion); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); see Police Dep’t of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (“To 
permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each 
individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government 
censorship.”). 
81. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995) (internal quotations
omitted); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (citations omitted) (“[T]he Court has 
frequently reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies the ‘highest rung of the hierarchy of First 
Amendment values,’ and is entitled to special protection.”).  
82. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347 (emphasis added). 
83. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
84. Id. at 268. 
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that the risk and expense of liability would undoubtedly censor public 
discussion and political debate, even if the speech was believed to be true, 
the Court unanimously ruled that public officials may not recover for 
defamatory statements relating to their official conduct unless they can 
prove “actual malice,” a heightened standard requiring a showing of 
“knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was 
false or not.”85 
Noting that “[i]t is as much [the citizen’s] duty to criticize as it is the 
official’s duty to administer,”86 the Court recognized a privileged right for 
citizens to criticize their public officials to ensure that public debate be 
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”87 He noted that the debate on public 
issues “may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly 
sharp attacks on government and public officials,”88 and that, while false 
and erroneous statements are inevitable, they too must be protected for the 
freedom to have necessary “breathing space” to survive.89 
B. Political Speech and the Executive Branch 
Within the context of the Executive, the suppression of political 
speech was further condemned by the Court in New York Times Co. v. 
United States.90 Claiming that the publication of the Pentagon Papers 
would “endanger the national security,” President Nixon argued that “the 
First Amendment was not intended to make it impossible for the 
Executive to function or to protect the security of the United States.”91 In 
his concurrence, Justice Black considered this a “bold and dangerously 
farreaching [sic] contention,” explaining that, “[t]o find that the President 
has ‘inherent power’ to halt the publication of news by resort to the courts 
would wipe out the First Amendment and destroy the fundamental liberty 
and security of the very people the Government hopes to make ‘secure.’”92 
Indeed, Justice Stewart drove this point home in his separate concurrence: 
85. Id. at 279-80. 
86. Id. at 282. 
87. Id. at 270. 
88. Id.
89. Id. at 271-72. The Court notes that “[e]ven a false statement may be deemed to make a
valuable contribution to public debate, since it brings about the clearer perception and livelier 
impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.” Id. at 279 n.19 (citations omitted) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
90. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). 
91. Id. at 718 (Black, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 718-19 (Black, J., concurring) (“[I]t was injunctions like those sought here that
Madison and his collaborators intended to outlaw in this Nation for all time.”). 
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[T]he only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the 
areas of national defense and international affairs may lie in an 
enlightened citizenry—in an informed and critical public opinion which 
alone can here protect the values of democratic government.93 
The Court has found that a thriving democracy requires the open and 
raw discussion and debate of public issues, politics, and the officials 
involved in them.94 “No form of speech is entitled to greater constitutional 
protection” than political advocacy, even of a highly controversial 
viewpoint.95 The Court has explained that the purpose behind the First 
Amendment is “to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation—and 
their ideas from suppression—at the hand of an intolerant society.”96 
C. Political Speech and New Technology 
In Citizens United v. FEC,97 the Court rejected the argument that the 
history of the First Amendment does not extend its protection of political 
speech to media corporations, reasoning: 
[t]he Framers may have been unaware of certain types of speakers or 
forms of communication, but that does not mean that those speakers and 
media are entitled to less First Amendment protection than those types 
of speakers and media that provided the means of communicating 
political ideas when the Bill of Rights was adopted.98 
The Court refused to draw constitutional lines for the dissemination 
of political speech throughout the development of new technology, for the 
93. Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring). This pronounced duty to the press later served an
important role in the exposure of President Nixon’s Watergate scandal less than a year later. See 
Stephen F. Rohde, Presidential Power Free Press, 40 L.A. LAW. 26, 30 (2017). 
94. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010) (“[I]t is inherent 
in the nature of the political process that voters must be free to obtain information from diverse sources 
in order to determine how to cast their votes.”); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (“Speech 
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”); Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976) (“In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the
citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential, for the identities of those 
who are elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation.”). 
95. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (“That this advocacy
occurred in the heat of a controversial referendum vote only strengthens the protection afforded to 
[political] expression.”). 
96. Id. at 357 (acknowledging that the broad protection afforded to political speech may have 
“unpalatable consequences,” society nonetheless “accords greater weight to the value of free speech 
than to the dangers of its misuse.”). 
97. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
98. Id. at 353-54 (noting that the great debates by the Federalists were “published and
expressed in the most important means of mass communication of that era—newspapers owned by 
individuals.”). 
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litigation and interpretive process in creating a bright-line rule would 
inevitably chill protected speech and create questionable precedent.99 
Nonetheless, “[t]he First Amendment was certainly not understood to 
condone the suppression of political speech in society’s most salient 
media.”100 Thus, political speech is not precluded from being found in a 
social media post, or even in more subtle forms such as a Facebook 
“like.”101 
IV. PACKINGHAM AND ITS IMPACT ON A PUBLIC OFFICIAL’S SOCIAL
MEDIA 
A. Packingham v. North Carolina 
The Supreme Court in Packingham v. North Carolina unanimously 
struck down a statute issued to protect children from Internet predators by 
prohibiting registered sex offenders from accessing social networking 
sites.102 Packingham is significant for Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion, declaring the Internet to be the “modern public square.”103 
However, the opinion has been criticized for its “expansive language” that 
has “opened a Pandora’s box” for its implication that the public forum 
doctrine applies to the Internet and social media, but “failing to account 
for the hybrid public and private nature of digital realms.”104 
The majority’s opinion begins with a discussion of the First 
Amendment’s protection of free speech in the “spatial context,” citing an 
example of a “basic rule” that “a street or a park is a quintessential forum 
for the exercise of First Amendment rights.”105 Justice Kennedy then 
notes that, “[w]hile in the past there may have been difficulty in 
identifying the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange 
99. Id. at 326, 352 (“With the advent of the Internet and the decline of print and broadcast
media, moreover, the line between the media and others who wish to comment on political and social 
issues becomes far more blurred.”). 
100.  Id. at 353. 
 101.  See Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 2013), as amended (Sept. 23, 2013) (finding 
a Facebook “like” to be a constitutionally protected form of expression under the First Amendment); 
Haleigh Jones, Public Officials’ Facebook “Likes”: The Case for Leaving Regulation of Official 
“Likes” to the Torches and Pitchforks of Constituents, 18 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 263 (2015) 
(explaining the political and commercial significance of a Facebook “like”). 
102.  137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017). 
103.  Id.  
104.  Note, First Amendment-Freedom of Speech-Public Forum Doctrine-Packingham v. North 
Carolina, 131 HARV. L. REV. 233, 233 (2017). 
 105.  Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735. 
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of views, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace—the ‘vast democratic 
forums of the Internet’ in general, and social media in particular.”106 
The Court went on to explain the significance of social media’s 
relationship with the First Amendment, citing Facebook for the free 
expression of religion and politics; LinkedIn for seeking employment; and 
Twitter for petitioning and engaging with local elected representatives.107 
This information laid the backdrop to the Court’s finding that the North 
Carolina statute’s language was overly broad because it prohibited access 
to lawful websites that are “integral to the fabric of our modern society 
and culture,” such as Google and Amazon.108 The Court stated: 
By prohibiting sex offenders from using those websites, North Carolina 
with one broad stroke bars access to what for many are the principal 
sources for knowing current events, checking ads for employment, 
speaking and listening in the modern public square, and otherwise 
exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge. These 
websites can provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms available 
to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard. . . . [T]o foreclose 
access to social media altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in 
the legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights.109 
The majority’s opinion was criticized by Justice Alito in his 
concurrence, labelling it “undisciplined dicta” and demonstrating concern 
for “the implications of the Court’s unnecessary rhetoric” by equating the 
“entirety of the internet with public streets and parks.”110 Since the Court 
previously held that “[t]he government does not create a forum by 
inaction . . . but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for 
public discourse,”111 the majority’s comparison of social media to the 
“quintessential public forum” of streets and parks adds more confusion to 
the forum doctrine’s categorization.112 Equating the Internet and social 
media to parks and streets implies it is a traditional public forum open by 
default and regardless of government intent, despite the Court’s prior 
emphasis on historic tradition for traditional forum status.113 
 106.  Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 868 
(1997)). 
 107.  Id. (noting that “Governors in all 50 States and almost every Member of Congress have set 
up [Twitter] accounts for this purpose.”). 
108.  Id. at 1735, 1738. 
109.  Id. at 1737. 
110.  Id. at 1738 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The Court is unable to resist musings that seem to 
equate the entirety of the internet with public streets and parks.”). 
111.  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).  
112.  See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735. 
113.  See supra text accompanying notes 24-29. 
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B. The Davison Cases 
Prior to the Court’s decision in Packingham, a Loudoun County 
resident filed suit against two public officials, the Commonwealth 
Attorney and the Chair of the County’s Board of Supervisors, for deleting 
his comments and blocking him off their respective Facebook pages.114 
The case against the Commonwealth Attorney, Davison v. Plowman,115 
was decided by a Virginia district court nearly four months prior to the 
Packingham decision. There, the court found the official’s Facebook page 
to be a limited public forum because the Loudoun County Social Media 
Comments Policy served the restricted purpose of “present[ing] matters 
of public interest in Loudoun County.”116 It was thereby permitted the 
reasonable, viewpoint-neutral regulation of speech that falls outside the 
forum’s purpose.117 
The Commonwealth Attorney posted a link to an article he had 
written concerning special prosecutors to his official Commonwealth 
Attorney Facebook, whereby Davison “responded by posting a lengthy 
comment that did not further any dialogue” regarding the article’s topic.118 
Rather, Davison claims that his comment was “political speech aimed at 
informing the public of [the official’s] actions and to eventually have 
[him] voted out of office.”119 The court found this sufficient to fall outside 
the scope of the limited forum and held that the comment’s removal “was 
both viewpoint neutral and reasonably related to the purpose of the 
forum.”120 
Four months later, the same court decided Davison v. Loudoun 
County Board of Supervisors.121 There, the Chair of Loudoun County 
Board of Supervisors created a Facebook outside of the County’s official 
channels so she would not be constrained to the County’s social media 
policies, but titled the page as “Chair Phyllis J. Randall.”122 Randall made 
a post on her page concerning a discussion panel she attended, whereby 
Davison responded with a comment alleging “corruption on the part of 
 114.  See Davison v. Plowman, 247 F. Supp. 3d 767 (E.D. Va. 2017), aff’d, No. 17-1771, 2018 
WL 1376887 (4th Cir. Mar. 19, 2018); Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 
702 (E.D. Va. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-2003 (4th Cir. Aug. 29, 2017).  
115.  247 F. Supp. 3d. 767 (E.D. Va. 2017). 
116.  Id. at 777. 
117.  Id. at 776. 
118.  Id. at 777. 
119.  Id. 
120.  Id.  
121.  267 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va. 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-2003 (4th Cir. Aug. 29, 
2017). 
122.  Id. at 707. 
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Loudoun County’s School Board.”123 Randall subsequently deleted the 
post, including Davison’s comment, and banned Davison from her 
Facebook page for twelve hours.124 Citing Packingham and noting that 
Randall’s posts requested open discussion on her page, the court 
concluded that Randall had opened a public forum and engaged in 
viewpoint discrimination by banning Davison from her Facebook page.125 
“By prohibiting Plaintiff from participating in her online forum because 
she took offense at his claim . . . Defendant committed a cardinal sin 
under the First Amendment.”126 
While both Davison cases involved the exclusion of a speaker based 
on his content, Davison I127 is distinguishable because the Commonwealth 
Attorney was protected by the County’s social media policy, which placed 
reasonable restrictions on speech that did not relate to the limited purpose 
of the forum.128 While the Chair official in Davison II129 “purposely 
created her Facebook page outside the County’s official channels so as to 
not be constrained by the [County’s] policies,”130 the court nonetheless 
found the official to be acting under “color of law” and her ban to be 
viewpoint discriminative.131 Thus, whether the public official has a social 
media policy is significant in finding the exclusion to be constitutional, so 
long as it is reasonable.132 
C. Being Blocked or Banned on Twitter 
Unlike a Facebook “page”, where banning someone does not prevent 
them from viewing the content posted by the page,133 being “blocked” on 
Twitter prevents the user from viewing the posts made by the Twitter 
123.  Id. at 711. 
124.  Id. 
125.  Id. at 716-17. 
126.  Id. at 717-18. 
127.  Plowman, 247 F. Supp. 3d 767. 
128.  Id. at 777. 
129.  Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F.Supp.3d 702. 
130.  Id. at 707. 
131.  Id. at 717 (“Indeed, the suppression of critical commentary regarding elected officials is 
the quintessential form of viewpoint discrimination against which the First Amendment guards.”). 
 132.  See Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 411-12 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding 
unconstitutional a police department’s social media policy prohibiting any negative comments “of 
great public concern”). 
 133.  Banning and Moderation, FACEBOOK HELP CENTER, https://www.facebook.com/help/
248844142141117/?helpref=hc_fnav (last visited Dec. 18, 2017). 
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account entirely.134 However, the user is only prevented from viewing the 
Twitter account when he or she is logged in on the account blocked.135 If 
the user logs out, or logs in to a third party account, the user may still be 
able to view the Twitter account he or she was previously blocked from.136 
The same is likely to be true for Facebook or any other social networking 
site. 
If users are still able to access a public official’s social media from 
different accounts, is there really a deprivation of free speech when they 
are blocked from one? This is where Packingham seems to have altered 
the realm of First Amendment analysis to social media. Prior to 
Packingham, the social media policy in Davison I protected the official’s 
removal of plaintiff’s comment, but it did not permit the outright ban of 
plaintiff from the official’s Facebook page.137 The court distinguished 
prior cases prohibiting a “blanket ban” from recurring public meetings, 
which involved “entirely forecloses a means of communication” and a 
failure to “leave adequate alternative channels of communication,”138 to 
plaintiff’s ban from the defendant’s page because he “could and did avail 
himself of Facebook and other social media platforms to reach his 
audience.”139 The court was referring to plaintiff’s act of purchasing 
Facebook ads, posting on his personal account, and creating new 
Facebook and Twitter accounts to voice his message,140 finding these 
measures “adequate alternative measures of communication,” despite his 
inability to comment directly on the defendant’s page.141 The court found 
that “any First Amendment right Plaintiff might have had to continue 
posting comments on Defendant’s Facebook page” was protected by the 
official’s qualified immunity.142 
 134.  How to block accounts on Twitter, TWITTER HELP CENTER, 
https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/blocking-and-unblocking-accounts (last visited Dec. 18, 
2017). 
135.  Id. 
136.  Id. 
137.  See Davison v. Plowman, 247 F. Supp. 3d 767, 779-80 (E.D. Va. 2017), aff’d, No. 17-
1771, 2018 WL 1376887 (4th Cir. Mar. 19, 2018). 
 138.  Id. at 779 (citing Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Directors of the Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 143 F. 
Supp. 3d 205 (M.D. Pa. 2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom. Barna v. Bd. of Sch. 
Directors of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2017)). 
139.  Id. 
140.  Id. at 775. 
141.  Id. at 779 (“Plaintiff adduced little evidence at trial tending to show that those alternative 
channels of communication were inadequate as compared to  commenting directly on Defendant’s 
Facebook page.”). 
142.  Id. at 780.  
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The post-Packingham decision in Davison II demonstrated a 
heightened interest in protecting the communication of plaintiff’s online 
speech. Acknowledging that the twelve-hour ban from the defendant’s 
Facebook page was “fairly minor” and that plaintiff’s speech was not 
“suppressed in any meaningful sense,” the court nonetheless explained 
that “the government violates the First Amendment by disfavoring 
‘offensive’ speech in ways far milder than outright suppression.”143 
Despite the similarity in the content of the message conveyed by the 
plaintiff in both cases,144 the court in Davison II was quick to find 
viewpoint discrimination in plaintiff’s exclusion from official’s Facebook 
page.145 A big factor in this conclusion is the absence of any social media 
policy guiding the official’s exclusion, as there was in Davison I.146 
V. APPLICATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE PRESIDENT’S 
SOCIAL MEDIA 
It was not long after the decision in Packingham was rendered that a 
lawsuit was filed against President Donald Trump for the alleged blocking 
of users from his Twitter account, @realDonaldTrump.147 The plaintiffs 
contend that the President blocked them “because of opinions they 
expressed in replies to the President’s tweets,” which consequentially 
prevented them from viewing, replying, and joining the public discussion 
associated with the President’s posts.148 Requesting declaratory and 
injunctive relief, the Complaint alleges that the President deprived not 
only the plaintiffs’ right to engage in the President’s Twitter discussions, 
but also deprived other Twitter users from reading the speech of those 
blocked.149 
 143.  Davison v. Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 718 (E.D. Va. 2017) 
(citation omitted).  
 144.  In Davison I, the comment related to alleged perjury on part of a Loudoun County school 
official and asks “[w]hy wouldn’t you at least assign a special prosecutor in this case?” Plowman, 247 
F. Supp. 3d at 773. The court disregarded the comment’s reference to special prosecutors, labelling it 
“mere window dressing” to address his “frustration that Defendant refused to pursue Plaintiff’s claims 
of perjury.” Id. at 777. In Davison II, neither party knew the exact comment’s content, but the 
defendant recalled it “included allegations of corruption on the part of Loudoun County’s School 
Board.” See Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 711.  
145.  Loudoun Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 718. 
 146.  Id. (“Neutral, comprehensive social media policies like that maintained by Loudoun 
County . . . may provide vital guidance for public officials and commenters alike . . .”). 
147.  See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 4, at 2. 
148.  Id. at 2-3. 
149.  Id. at 3; see City of San Diego, Cal. v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (“The interest at stake 
is as much the public’s interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the [person’s] own right to 
disseminate it.”). 
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Silencing opposing speakers by restricting access to a forum they 
have a constitutional right to be in would undoubtedly chill speech, as 
users would risk losing access to the President’s Twitter by voicing their 
objections to his position on a matter of public concern. First Amendment 
protection is afforded to both speaker and the listener, who each enjoy a 
privileged right to participate in discussion of the President and his 
qualifications for future elections.150 The Supreme Court has made clear 
“it is inherent in the nature of the political process that voters must be free 
to obtain information from diverse sources in order to determine how to 
cast their votes.”151 However, finding a constitutional violation requires 
the determination of whether the President has created a public forum 
through his social media account. 
A. The President’s Twitter: @realDonaldTrump 
The Twitter account, @realDonaldTrump, is commonly used by the 
President and his Administration152 to announce government policy, share 
his anticipated actions on important public and political issues, and to 
voice his opinion on matters relating to both his official and personal 
capacities.153 The account has over 44.9 million followers that engage in 
the discussion of the President’s posts (called “tweets”) by replying (or 
“retweeting”) to his original response and making their opinions viewable 
to other Twitter users.154 On its face, the @realDonaldTrump account 
seems to be maintained by the President in his official capacity, 
identifying himself as the “45th President of the United States of 
 150.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13 (1976) (“Discussion of public issues and debate on 
the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established 
by our Constitution.”); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010) (“The 
First Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow from each.”). 
151.  Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 341.  
 152.  Dan Scavino, the White House Director of Social Media, is known to occasionally tweet 
for the President from his @realDonaldTrump account. See Eliana Johnson, Dan Scavino is the other 
@realDonaldTrump, POLITICO (June 10, 2017, 7:22 AM), https://www.politico.com/
story/2017/06/10/dan-scavino-trump-social-media-profile-239381 [https://perma.cc/G49B-U6RV]. 
153.  See generally Amanda Wills & Alysha Love, All the President’s tweets, CNN POLITICS 
(last updated April 8, 2018, 9:12 AM), http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2017/politics/trump-tweets/ 
[https://perma.cc/UAY9-E7TH]. 
 154.  See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump (last visited Dec. 19, 2017). Since his election, the President has tweeted over 2,461 
times, posting an average of six to seven times a day; Jessica Estepa, Trump has tweeted 2,461 times 
since the election. Here’s a breakdown of his Twitter use, USA TODAY: ON POLITICS NEWSLETTER, 
(last updated Nov. 8, 2017, 12:26 PM) https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/politics/onpolitics/2017/11/07/trump-has-tweeted-2-461-times-since-election-heres-
breakdown-his-twitter-use/822312001/ [https://perma.cc/TE5D-AFWU]. 
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America” beneath his name.155 The President’s tweets from the 
@realDonaldTrump account have even been deemed “official 
statements” of the President of the United States by former White House 
Press Secretary Sean Spicer,156 the Department of Justice,157 the Ninth 
Circuit,158 and President Trump himself.159 
A separate account designated for the President of the United States, 
@POTUS, was created and used by President Barack Obama back in 
2015.160 While President Trump is featured on the page, he appears to 
only use the account to retweet posts made by @realDonaldTrump and 
other accounts associated with his Administration.161 In a section beneath 
the name “President Trump” on the @POTUS account, there is a link to 
the @realDonaldTrump account, as well as a link to the official White 
House Privacy Policy.162 The Policy has a section beneath the heading 
“Third-Party Websites” stating, “The White House maintains official 
pages or accounts on third-party websites in order to better engage with 
the American public.”163 While the Policy does not state which accounts 
155.  Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), supra note 154. 
 156.  Elizabeth Landers, White House: Trump’s tweets are ‘official statements’, CNN POLITICS, 
(last updated June 6, 2017, 4:37 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/06/politics/trump-tweets-official-
statements/index.html [https://perma.cc/URZ6-CE72]. 
157.  Defendant’s Supplemental Submission and Further Response to Plaintiffs’ Post-Briefing 
Notices at 4, James Madison Project v. DOJ, No. 1:17-cv-144-APM (D.D.C. Nov. 13, 2017), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4200037/Trump-Twitter-20171113.pdf. 
 158.  Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 773 n.14 (9th Cir. 2017) cert. granted sub nom. Trump v. 
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), and cert. granted, judgment vacated, 138 S. 
Ct. 377 (2017), and vacated, 874 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2017)(citing President Trump’s tweet to support 
invalidating the President’s executive order prohibiting nationals from six designated countries from 
entering the United States). 
 159.  See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 1, 2017, 3:41 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/881281755017355264 (referring to his use of social 
media as “MODERN DAY PRESIDENTIAL”). 
 160.  Roberta Rampton, Obama gets his own account on Twitter: ‘It’s Barack. Really!’, 
REUTERS (May 18, 2015 12:35 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-obama-twitter/obama-gets-
his-own-account-on-twitter-its-barack-really-idUSL1N0Y915O20150518 [https://perma.cc/T5YK-
KFCJ].  
 161.  See President Trump (@POTUS), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/POTUS (last visited Dec. 
19, 2017). 
162.  Id. 
 163.  Privacy Policy, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, https://www.whitehouse.gov/privacy-policy/ (last 
updated Dec. 13, 2017) (changed to lowercase). It also states that the “White House archives some 
information that users submit or publish when engaging with the White House through official White 
House pages or accounts on third-party websites (e.g., by sending a message, posting a comment, 
‘following,’ ‘friending,’ or taking similar actions).” Id. 
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are the “official White House accounts,” it may be presumed that they are 
those accounts that link to the Privacy Policy on the main page.164 
B. Public Forum or Personal Account? 
The Privacy Policy’s statement that these accounts are used to “better 
engage with the American public” would satisfy the government intent 
requirement to open a public forum on those accounts linking to the 
Policy, but does not indicate any limitations on speech as the policy in 
Davison I did.165 Nevertheless, is the absence of the Policy from the 
President’s @realDonaldTrump account an indication that he did not 
intend to open a public forum? After all, @realDonaldTrump was created 
long before Donald Trump was elected President,166 and the Supreme 
Court has held that the First Amendment protects a public employee’s 
right to speak as a citizen on matters of public concern.167 While the 
President’s own First Amendment rights are still afforded protection, an 
exception exists for public officials who “make statements pursuant to 
their official duties.”168 However, the Court has clarified that the proper 
inquiry is “whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope 
of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.”169 
Even assuming the account is Donald Trump’s personal Twitter, the 
President’s status as the highest-ranked public official should require an 
affirmative showing of such to ensure his account is not viewed as a public 
forum welcoming open discussion.170 Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
 164.  See e.g., President Donald Trump (@POTUS), supra note 161; The White House 
(@WhiteHouse), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/WhiteHouse (last visited Dec. 19, 2017); Vice 
President Mike Pence (@VP), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/VP (last visited Dec. 19, 2017). Vice 
President Mike Pence also seems to have a second Twitter account that does not feature the Privacy 
Policy. Mike Pence (@mike_pence), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/mike_pence (last visited Dec. 19, 
2017). 
 165.  The social media policy in Plowman reserved the right to “delete submissions that violated 
the enumerated rules,” namely, comments that were “clearly off topic.” Davison v. Plowman, 247 F. 
Supp. 3d 767, 772 (E.D. Va. 2017) (internal quotations omitted). 
166.  Donald J. Trump, supra note 154 (indicating the account was created in March 2009). 
 167.  See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006) (“[P]ublic employees do not surrender 
all their First Amendment rights by reason of their employment.”). A public official has been regarded 
as a public employee whose position would “invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person 
holding it.” Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 n.13 (1966). 
168.  Id. at 421.  
169.  Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379 (2014); see Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423 (“Employees 
who make public statements outside the course of performing their official duties retain some 
possibility of First Amendment protection because that is the kind of activity engaged in by citizens 
who do not work for the government”). 
 170.  As Professor Norton observed, “certain positions trigger such high public expectations that 
those employees could never escape their governmental role to speak purely as private citizens even 
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demonstrated a strong interest in protecting the public’s right to criticize 
public officials.171 The Court in Rosenblatt v. Baer stated: 
There is, first, a strong interest in debate on public issues, and, second, 
a strong interest in debate about those persons who are in a position 
significantly to influence the resolution of those issues. Criticism of 
government is at the very center of the constitutionally protected area of 
free discussion. Criticism of those responsible for government 
operations must be free, lest criticism of government itself be 
penalized.172 
Because the President holds a title of political and public importance, 
the public should be free to not only criticize him, but also observe his 
engagement with the general public in order to determine his 
qualifications as an elected official.173 By blocking users for their 
criticism of his official conduct, the President not only engages in 
viewpoint discrimination, but also censorship of constitutionally-
protected political speech.174 Any individual interest the President had is 
substantially outweighed by the selective suppression of speech from the 
public discussion he engages in on his publicly-accessible online 
forum.175 Therefore, public forum status should be assigned to the 
President’s Twitter, @realDonaldTrump.176 To hold otherwise would 
when off the job.” See Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control 
of its Worker’s Speech to Protect its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 50 (2009); id. at 59-60 
(explaining how a contextual approach would consider the nature of the speaker’s occupation in 
assessing whether the public employee is speaking as a citizen or on behalf of his or her employer). 
 171.  See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 299 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“In 
a democratic society, one who assumes to act for the citizens in an executive, legislative, or judicial 
capacity must expect that his official acts will be commented upon and criticized.”). 
172.  Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). 
 173.  Id. at 86 (“Where a position in government has such apparent importance that the public 
has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, beyond 
the general public interest in the qualifications and performance of all government employees, both 
elements we identified in [Sullivan] are present.”). 
174.  See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 297 (Black, J., concurring) (“For a representative democracy 
ceases to exist the moment that the public functionaries are by any means absolved from their 
responsibility to their constituents; and this happens whenever the constituent can be restrained in any 
manner from speaking, writing, or publishing his opinions upon any public measure, or upon the 
conduct of those who may advise or execute it.” (citation omitted)). 
 175.  See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 326-27 (2010) (explaining 
that First Amendment standards “must give the benefit of any doubt to protecting rather than stifling 
speech.” (quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007)). 
 176.  See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (“[T]he Court must 
exercise extreme caution before suggesting that the First Amendment provides scant protection for 
access to vast networks in that medium.”). 
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chill “speech that is central to the meaning and purpose of the First 
Amendment.”177 
C. A New Approach 
This Note proposes that a public forum presumption be assigned to 
the social media accounts of public officials that are highly ranked and 
maintain social media accounts within their official capacities. 
Packingham furthers this approach, given its heightened stance on the 
protection afforded to social media and deeming it as the “most 
important” place to exercise free expression.178 With the massive, low-
cost, and easily accessible spatial dimension of the Internet, a heightened 
standard is appropriate where a public forum would otherwise be opened 
in an area inaccessible to certain speakers.179 Therefore, the higher up in 
government a public official is, the greater the presumption should be that 
his or her social media is a public forum, absent affirmative indications 
that he or she intended to keep the account private. 
VI. CONCLUSION
While Packingham v. North Carolina gave hope to bringing clarity 
to the public forum doctrine’s application to social media, the decision 
may have stirred up more confusion in the application of the doctrine’s 
three categories. Nonetheless, Packingham signifies a coming-of-age 
perspective to the constitutional protection afforded to online speech, 
indicating a challenge for public officials to show that their social media 
pages are either limited forums or personal accounts before choosing to 
exclude users’ comments or ban them entirely. However, the higher up in 
the government hierarchy the public official stands, the greater the 
government’s burden should be to demonstrate that his or her social media 
are nonpublic or private accounts. The implications of the President’s 
social media bans are far greater than they would be if he wasn’t serving 
as the public’s highest-elected official. By excluding speakers for their 
criticism of his official conduct, the President is impeding on the First 
Amendment’s core by suppressing political speech that is necessary for 
democracy to function efficiently. 
177.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. at 329. 
178.  Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735. 
179.  Id. at 1737 (“[Social media] allow a person with an Internet connection to ‘become a town 
crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox.’” (quoting Reno v. Am. Civil 
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)). 
